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THE JOINDER OF ACTIONS IN INDIANA
(CONCLUDED)
BERNARD C. GAVIT
Sec. 13. Action to Recover Possession of Real Property and
Damages. The fifth class created by the code is for "claims to
recover the possession of real property, with or without dam-
ages, rents and profits for the withholding thereof, and for waste
or damage done to the land; to make partition of and to deter-
mine and quiet the title to real property."
The statute here creates a class to include four different kinds
of actions: 1. Ejectment, 2. Trespass or case for waste or in-
jury done to the land,' 3. Partition, and 4. Quiet title. It is to
be noted that the second group, that is, for injury done to the
land, is limited again to the land involved. Assuming that the
first paragraph of complaint is for ejectment as to Lot X, the
plaintiff could not properly join an action in his second para-
graph of complaint for injuries to Lot Y. Whether such an
,action can be joined with an action of Partition or Quiet Title
even although it be for injury to the land involved in those ac-
tions is questionable from the wording of the statute. The
phrasing of the sentence would indicate that it was only an action
to recover for injuries to the land in an ejectment action which
could be joined with an action in ejectment. There is one case
which may well be interpreted to place such a construction on
the statute.2
In that case an action to quiet title and an action for nuisance
were held to be improperly joined. No reason is given in the
opinion. Whether an action for nuisance would fall within the
classification of an action for "damages done to the land" is of
course questionable, although if the nuisance consisted of acts
by the defendant which caused physical injury to the land it
would obviously fall within the language in question. If it had
to do with the pollution cf the air, or was the result of other
I It was held in City of Huntington v. Stemen, 37 Ind. App. 553 (1905),
that actions for nuisance and to quiet title could not be joined. Whether
this was because the nuisance was thought not to be an action for dam-
ages for injury done to the land, or it was thought that such an action
could be joined only with an action of ejectment, does not appear from the
opinion.
2 Supra note 1.
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acts which affected the enjoyment of the property rather than a
physical injury to it it might well be held here that it was not
an action for "damages done to the land." In either event, of
course, the law protects the plaintiff's rights in relation to the
land, and not the land itself. A physical injury to the land is
actionable, therefore, not because of the physical injury, but
because such physical injury is an invasion of the plaintiff's
right to be free from such acts as against the defendant and in
respect to the land in question.3 An action for nuisance occa-
sioned solely by the polution of the air is therefore in one sense
as much an action for damages for injury to land, as is an ac-
tion of trespass q. c. f., because both after all are actions for
damages for injury to the plaintiff's rights in respect to the
land. At the same time there is a distinction between a physi-
cal injury which changes the form of the land and its improve-
ments, and one which in common usage is regarded as an inva-
sion of its enjoyment. It seems quite probable that the statute
in question makes that distinction. Therefore, if in the Steman
case the action for nuisance was of the latter character the deci-
sion would be correct.
If, however, the case interprets the statute to allow an action
for damages to the land only when the principal action is in
ejectment it is submitted that the result is narrow and that it
is bad in policy. As was stated above the phrasing of the sta-
tute would at first blush indicate such a result, because of the
use of a comma after "thereof" instead of a semi-colon. Courts,
however, have been quite free to disregard such minor errors
in punctuation in order to reach a fair result.4 That is, there
ought to be no presumption that the Legislature knows any
more about grammar than it actually knows, which obviously is
very little. A fair construction of this statute then is that there
are four distinct subdivisions and that an action for damages
could be joined with an action for partition or quiet title, pro-
vided the same land was involved in each action.
In any event if there is an action in ejectment: one for dam-
ages and one to quiet title: that case clearly falls within the
statute.5
It is to be observed that in any event the second action must
3 See Covenants Running With the Land, 5 Ind. L. J. 786 (1930).
4 Ifing v. State, 185 Ind. 312 (1916).
G Cargar v. Fee, 140 Ind. 572 (1894); Richwine v. Presbyterian Church,
135 Ind. 80 (1893).
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be for damages and that an equitable action for a mandatory
injunction against the maintenance of a fence alleged to consti-
tute a nuisance cannot properly be joined.6
An action for partition and one for quieting title can, of
course, be joined7 as also one for ejectment and quieting title.8
Legal and Equitable Actions. In view of the fact that the ac-
tion of ejectment is regarded as an adequate legal remedy there
is no equitable action for the possession of real estate.9 And the
statutory actions of Partition and quiet Title are to all intents
and purposes legal actions. 10 The action for waste or damages
would normally be legal, so that the situation would be rare in-
deed where there would arise an occasion for the joinder of
legal and equitable actions under this section. But if the situ-
ation should arise there would seem to be no doubt again that, of
itself, that would constitute no valid objection.
Sec. 14. Actions of Specific Performance and Cancellation of
Instruments. The sixth clause of the code allows the joinder of
"claims to enforce specific performance of contracts, and to
avoid contracts for fraud or mistake." Apparently there are no
cases decided under this section,' but it seems clear that joinder
of the equitable actions of specific performance and of cancella-
tion or recission of contracts is permitted. There is some con-
fusion between this section, and Section 287 Burns Annotated
Indiana Statutes 1926 in the minds of some authorities,2 but the
latter deals with reformation of instruments, while this section
deals with the cancellation and recission of contracts.
It is quite likely that "contracts" as used in this section does
not include a deed, lease or other conveyance. There is no indi-
cation that the word is not used in its technical sense,3 while
6 Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17 (1904).
7 Schissel v. Dickson, 129 Ind. 139 (1891).
s Muffley v. Turner, 141 Ind. 580 (1895).
9 Paetz v. Mix, 80 Ind. App. 449 (1923). Cf. Clarkson Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 23 F. (2nd) 208 (1927), and note in 41 H. L. R. 924.
10 A jury trial is a matter of right in each instance. Kitts v. Wilson,
106 Ind. 147 (1885) (partition); Trittipo v. Morgan, 99 Ind. 269 (1884)
(quiet title).
Sec. 14.
' The case of Hunter v. McCoy, 14 Ind. 428 (1860), cited under it in
Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, is not in point.
2 See note 1 supra.
3 It must, therefore, be interpreted accordingly. Sec. 247 (1) Burns
Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
Sec. 15.
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the use of the broader "instruments in writing" in the next sec-
tion indicates a conscious intention to make a distinction.
Sec. 15. Action To Foreclose Mortgages, etc. Clause 7 pro-
vides for the joinder of actions on:
A. Claims to foreclose mortgages,
B. Claims to enforce or discharge specific liens,
C. Claims to recover personal judgment upon the debt se-
cured by such mortgage or lien,
D. Claims to subject to sale real property upon demands
against decedents' estates when such property has passed to
heirs, devisees or their assigns,
E. Claims to marshall assets,
F. Claims to substitute one person to the rights of another.
G. Claims arising out of a contract or a duty and not fall-
ing within either of the foregoing classes.
It is believed that sub-class G here is really a general class
and should have been numbered clause and class 8. It is, there-
fore, discussed separately in the next section.
Sub-classes A, B, C, D, and E refer to well defined legal and
equitable actions, and there should be little difficulty in connec-
tion with them. It is to be noted that there is no requirement
here that the same property be involved in the actions joined.
The plaintiff therefore, could join actions for foreclosure of a
mortgage on Lot X, for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien on Lot
Y (or foreclosure of a lien on personal property, for that mat-
ter), for personal judgment on the debts secured by the mort-
gage or lien, for the sale of Lot Z to pay the debts of the dece-
dent,1 for the marshaling of assets as to all those lots and others.
Sub-class F deals with "claims to substitute one person to the
rights of another." What the so-called intention of the legisla-
ture was here is a little hard to grasp. It is possible that the
clause refers to actions of Interpleader, Creditors Bills, Receiv-
erships or Attachments. But logically it then would include a
great many other proceedings in rem, for example, Partition,
Foreclosure of Liens and Sale of Real Estate (by guardian or
administrator or a wife against a deserting husband).
1 Such an action may only be brought by an administrator or executor
(Sec. 3179 et seq. Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, and in particular Sec. 3183
and Sec. 3185.) The general provision that all actions joined must affect
the same parties would probably require that all other actions be by the
administrator or executor. See Section 6 supra.
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Or it may include only an action to compel an assignment.
(Although it would seem as if that were included under specific
performance in class 6.) Or it may include Subrogation. There
have been no cases decided which attempt to construe this pro-
vision.
Sub-classes A and C were involved in the case of Sharts v.
Await.2 In that case the creditor of a mortgagee garnisheed
the mortgagor: recovered judgment against both aid likewise a
judgment of foreclosure as to the mortgage. In a subsequent
suit brought by an assignee of the mortgage it was said that the
joinder was proper. The court, however, rests the decision on
Section 178 of the Code of 1852, which is now Section 1007
Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes (1926).3 This section neces-
sarily refers to the other provisions of the code and therefore
the joinder must rest on the joinder statutes. The joinder
might be sustained under sub-classes A, C, and F, although it
quite clearly was proper under Section 288 Burns Annotated
Indiana Statutes (1926).-
Foreclosure and Quiet Title. Again actions joined must fall
within the sub-classes created by this section, and thus an action
to foreclose a mortgage and to quiet title cannot be joined under
the statute in question. 5 But it has been held that under the
statutes on foreclosure adverse and prior claims may be liti-
gated. The court regards the result, however, not as a joinder
of actions to foreclose and to quiet title, but solely an action to
foreclose with the incidental remedy of quieting title.7 The re-
sult could well be sustained again under Section 288 of the
joinder statute,s and a defendant could well raise the question
by demanding a jury trial.
2 73 Ind. 304 (1881).
3 "All such proceedings, (when a garnishee fails to appear) pleadings
and process shall be had according to the practice in other cases, as shall
be necessary to determine the rights of the parties and render a final
judgment."
4 Infra. Sec. 18.
5 Butler University v. Conrad, 94 Ind. 353 (1883).
6 Secs. 1172, 13487 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
7 Masters v. Templeton, 92 Ind. 447 (1883); City of Covington v. Fer-
gerson, 167 Ind. 42 (1906). The case of Pancoast v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 79 Ind. 172 (1881), to the contrary must be considered as impliedly
overruled.
8 Sec. 18 infra.
Sec. 16.
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See. 16. Causes of Action Arising Out of a Contract or Duty.
It seems quite clear that the comma which precedes this section'
should be either a period or colon, and that the phrase "not fall-
ing within either of the foregoing classes" refers to the general
clause created by the entire section, and does not refer to the
sub-classes created by clause or class 7. This phrase then really
creates a class which should have been numbered 8. The result
would be the same, whether it be a sub-class or a general class,
but as the former it would, for instance, be a duplication of
general class number 1,2 whereas as the latter it would permit
the joinder of contract actions not covered by class 1, which is
a more reasonable and obvious interpretation.
The first portion of the clause seems quite clearly to allow the
joinder of an action for specific performance of a contract, and
one for damages for its breach (in the alternative). Does it
allow a joinder of an action of specific performance of contract
A and with one for damages for the breach of contract B? Does
"a contract" mean "the same" contract; "any contract?" It
may mean either.
It is submitted that it ought to be construed to mean "the
same." It means too much if it is construed as "any," for it
would entirely supersede Class 1, and parts of all the other
classes except possibly classes 2 and 3. And apparently it was
inserted to take the place of the "transaction" clause in the
usual joinder provision in other codes, and the language there
is "the same transaction," which has been and must be, con-
strued to mean a definite situation.4
More important than those considerations, however, is that
which arises out of the use of the same word in the later phrase
"or a duty." "A" cannot here be construed to mean "any," for
if it is that phrase supersedes and destroys the entire balance
of the code on joinder of actions. Every cause of action arises
out of a "duty" of some sort. The code was written before the
legal philosophers had distinguished between rights, powers,
privileges and immunities and their correlatives. Today "duty"
is used only as a correlative of "right," but in 1852 and 1881
"right" was used in its broadest sense and included every legally
1 * * *, "and all other causes of action arising out of contract or a
duty, and not falling withia either of the foregoing classes."
2 "Money demands on contract."
31 C. J. 1.
4 See The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J. 299-315.
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recognized interest, and therefore "duty" would necessarily have
to be accorded the same broad meaning and mean the corre-
sponding "duty" arising out of any legally recognized right.
The joinder of causes of action arising out of "any duty"
would allow an unlimited joinder. "A duty" must be construed
to mean "the same duty," and therefore "a" ought to mean the
same in the preceding phrase "a contract." 5
Arising out of a (the same) Contract. This same phrase is
used in the counter-claim statute, and because of its importance
in that connection the detailed discussion as to its meaning is
found in that connection. 6 Based on the reasons and conclusions
there set out it is submitted that here the code permits the
joinder of actions, or complaints, based on rights (or causes of
action) which "come into being partly out of the same contract
(in fact)," and that they do so "come into being" when there is
a causal connection in fact (one fact in common) between the
factual situations which form the bases of the various complaints
joined. Thus, one could join under this provision an action for
damages for fraud inducing a contract and also recover for a
breach the contract, despite the fact that one is ex contractu
and the other ex delicto.7 Or one could sue for specific perform-
ance, or for damages, in the alternative.
There is apparently only one case decided under this clause.
It was said in the case of State, ex rel. v. Peckham8 that it per-
mitted the joinder of an action to set aside a judgment approv-
ing a guardian's final report with an action to recover on his
bond. There is no discussion in the case, and again it seems
obvious that in any event the joinder was proper under Sec.
288. 9 But it might be said that the causes of action both arose
out of the same contract (that is, the bond) for the cause of
action for breach of contract and for fraud might come into
being out of the same facts which give rise to the right to set
aside a fraudulent final report. For the same reason it might
be said that they arose out of the same duty.
5 The same word used more than once in the same section or statute
is presumably used each time in the same sense. Ryan v. State, 174 Ind.
468 (1910).
a It is to be discussed in a later paper.
7 See, for example, France, etc., Corp. v. Berwind White Co., 229 N. Y.
89, 127 N. E. 893, 10 A. L. R. 752 (1920). The case of Nave v. Powell,
62 Ind. App. 274 (1916), could thus be sustained.
8136 Ind. 198 (1893).
9 Infra. Sec. 18.
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Arising out of a (the same) Duty. This phrase is used in the
set-off statute, and is likewise discussed in detail there.10 Based
on the reasons and conclusions there stated it is submitted that
here the code permits the joinder of actions where there is cause
in fact between the different paragraphs of complaint, and re-
gardless of whether they are based on contract or tort rights."
The phrase then, to all intents and purposes, constitutes a
transaction clause, and the case of Nave v. Powef112 could here
be sustained as it could under the "arising out of the same con-
tract" clause. In that case the court held that a joinder of an
action on breach of warranty and an action for fraud in induc-
ing the contract could be joined because "they arose out of the
same transaction." The court cites only an Ohio case, where
the code does contain such a clause.'3 Obviously the case is no
authority under the Indiana statute: but as suggested here the
same result could be, and ought to be reached under the clause
in question.
The question as to when causes of action arise out of (or come
into being out of) the same duty is the simple question as to
whether there is cause in fact between the factual situations
involved in the various paragraphs of complaint. That it, "but
for" one fact in one factual situation would the other have come
into existence. Is there a common fact which would be involved
in proof of both causes of action? 14
Such an interpretation of this clause would without question
permit the joinder of an action for personal injuries and an ac-
tion for injuries to property arising out of the same accident.15
10 It is to be discussed in a later paper.
11 But it was held in the Indianapolis and Cincinnati R. v. Ballard, 22
Ind. 448 (1864), that in the set-off statute the word "duty" was confined
to "contract duty."
12 62 Ind. App. 274 (1916).
13 Pages' Annot. Gen. Code, 1926, Sec. 11306.
14 See, The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J. 203, 295.
15 There seems to be no Indiana case on this question. Cf. Hoover v.
Meyer, 74 Ind. App. 9 (1920), reaching an opposite result under the coun-
terclaim statute. But see, Eagan v. New York Transportation Co., 39
Misc. Rep. 111, 78 N. Y. S. 209 (1902). See notes and cases referred to
in 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 319. Some courts have reached the same result by
calling both causes of action but one "code cause of action." See King v.
C. Al. & St. P., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N. W. 1113, 50 L. R. A. 161, 81 A. S. R.
238 (1900). Contra, Ochs v. Public Serv. Ry., 81 N. J. L. 661, 80 A. 495,
36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 240, Ann. Cas. 1912 D, 225. The difficulty with the
solution in the King case is that the court uses the transaction clause in
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There would be no reason either why one could not join ac-
tions to recover possession of property and foreclose a mortgage
on it if the rights arose out of the same instrument. 16
Sec. 17. Reformation and Other Relief. Sec. 287 provides
that "when the plaintiff desires to recover the possession of title
papers or other instruments in writing, or correct any mistakes
therein, a separate action may be brought therefor; or the pos-
session-recovered or mistakes recovered in any other action
when such recovery or correction would be essential to a com-
plete remedy."
The obvious purpose here is to allow the plaintiff to reform
an instrument and recover upon it as reformed. Thus one may
reform a deed,2 a mortgage, 3 a note,4 a contract 5 and seek also
any appropriate remedy on the instrument as reformed. The
language of the code is quite broad and says any "instrument in
writing," but, of course it is procedural only and would not
allow the reformation, for example, of a will, where equity dis-
claims power to act.6
the joinder statute to create one cause of action, and we have the ab-
surdity that there is one cause of action because both rights arise out of
the same transaction, and therefore after all no question of joinder be-
cause there is one and not two causes of action. The joinder statute itself
is used to defeat any reason for its existence.
16 Cf. Butler University v. Conrad, 94 Ind. 353 (1883), where however,
the actual facts are not disclosed and the clause in question was not
discussed.
See. 17.
1 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926. Knarr v. Conway, 42 Ind. 260 (1873).
2 Cf. Smith v. Kyler, 74 Ind. 575 (1881), and Earl v. Van Natta, 29
Ind. App. 532 (1902), holding that reformation plus possession constitutes
but one cause of action.
3 Walls v. State, 140 Ind. 16 (1894).
4 Rigsbee v. Trees, 21 Ind. 227 (1863).
5 Palmer Steel & Iron Co. v. Heat, L. & P. Co., 160 Ind. 232 (1903).
The court puts the decision on Sec. 281, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1901, which
is now Sec. 288, Burns 1926, and also talks about there being but one cause
of action, and the money judgment being "incidental relief;" but clearly the
case falls within the section in question. The case of Monroe v. Skelton,
36 Ind. 302 (1871), is correctly decided under the provision in question.
6 See Dennis v. Holsapple, 148 Ind. 297, 62 A. S. R. 526, 46 L. R. A. 168;
Bingel v. Volz, 142 Ill. 214, 31 N. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. 321, 34 A. S. R. 64;
and 1 Page, Wills (2nd Ed. 1926), Sec. 174.
Cf. Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 A. R. 690 (1871), saying that
equity may reform a mistake apparent on the face of the instrument,
which probably only means that in construing a will the court will disre-
gard an apparent mistake.
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Although the section in question apparently gives the plaintiff
a right to maintain separate actions of reformation and recov-
ery on the instruments it is well to remember that in the recent
case of Royal Ins. Co. v. Stewart,7 the Supreme Court held that
an action to reform and recover on the reformed instrument was
barred by a prior unsuccessful action to recover on the instru-
ment "as was." This is in keeping with the modern doctrine of
res judicata.
Sec. 18. Actions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances, etc.
Sec. 288,1 provides as follows: "When the action arises out of
contract, the plaintiff may join such other matters in his com-
plaint as may be necessary for a complete remedy and speedy
satisfaction of his judgment, although such other matters fall
within some other one or more of the foregoing classes."
It is to be noted that this section applies only if the principal
action is one arising out of contract. There is no reason to
suppose but that again the code here uses "contract" as mean-
ing ex contractu, and therefore includes quasi contractual
rights.2
Primarily the purpose of the statute seems to be to allow tile
joinder of an action on a contractual right with an action to set
aside a fraudulent conveyance.3 But it has also been held that
it permits an action on a debt and a suit to enjoin the fraudulent
transfer of the debtor's property.4
While it seems quite clear that the code here regards the action
on the debt and the action to set aside or enjoin the fraudulent
conveyance as separate actions the language of the cases decided
by the Indiana courts in this connection indicates that the courts
regard the situation as involving a principal action in equity to
reach the debtors' property and, seem to regard the juagment
on the debt as being supplemental or incidental to that, that is,
after all there is but one action involved.5 This conclusion is
7 190 Ind. 444 (1921).
See. 18.
1 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat., 1926.
2 See Sec. 8, supra.
3 Prince v. Engle, 77 Ind. App. 439 (1922), and cases there cited.
4 Field v. Holzint, 93 Ind. 205 (1883).
G See the cases cited in notes 3 and 4, supra, and also the case of
Pontius, 136 Ind. 641 (1893), discussed in detail in Sec. 6, supra.
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further sustained by those cases which hold that the parties are
not entitled to a jury trial.6
The question as to the true theory in these cases could be
raised by a motion to separate, or a demand for a jury trial, as
to the whole or part. The result would probably be that the
courts would hold that the action was still essentially equitable7
and that the personal judgment was in the nature of supple-
mental and incidental relief. Such a result presents no question
of joinder, for there is but one cause of action involved. If the
plaintiff fails as to the fraudulent conveyance aspect of the case
there is presented the question involved in Elliott v. Poutins,8
discussed in Section 6, supra.
Sec. 19. Foreclosure Suits. Originally a suit to foreclose a
mortgage was strictly equitable, and the decree was a foreclosure
of the equity of redemption. It operated solely to extend the
time set in the original conveyance for the payment of the loan,
and the consequent forfeiture of the mortgagor's interest in the
property upon the condition subsequent.' But in a state where
the so-called "lien theory" prevails (as in Indiana) there is no
longer a transfer of title upon a condition subsequent to the
mortgagee, but only the transfer of a so-called "mortgage in-
terest" or "lien." The mortgagee can only realize on this through
an action to foreclose, the purpose and result of which is to sell
the property to satisfy the debt.8 It seems quite clear that the
mortgagee's interest in the property is thus only a power of
sale, which normally must be exercised through the means of a
judicial decree.4 The same theory exists as to other liens.
6 Lake v. Lake, 99 Ind. 339 (1884) ; Stiz v. Sadler, 109 Ind. 254 (1886).
Contra. Scott v. The Indianapolis Wagon Works, 48 Ind. 75 (1874).
7 Equity did take jurisdiction in these cases, although the remedy at
law was adequate (i. e., the conveyance being void the judgment plaintiff
could levy on it in the hands of the third person). Apparently because it
was thought that the "fraud" gave jurisdiction. See, Wait, Fraudulent
Conveyances (2nd Ed. 1889), p. 78, et seq.
s Supra, note 5.
Sec. 19.
1 Tiffany, Real Property (2nd Ed. 1920), Sees. 599-501.
2 Brown v. Follette, 155 Ind. 316 (1900).
3 Sees. 1170, 1171, 1172, 1174-1179, 13474, 13487, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat.
1926.
4 See, Gavit, "Under the Lien Theory of Mortgage is the Mortgage
Only a Power of Sale?" 15 Minn. L. R. 147 (1931); "Is a Power of Sale
in a Mortgage Valid in Indiana," 5 Ind. L. J. 293 (1930).
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It is customary to seek a personal judgment on the debt
secured by the lien. Is there one cause of action, or two? In
view of the fact that the statute; specifically allows separate
actions on the debt and to foreclose it would appear that there
were two causes of action. The joinder statute specifically al-
lows the joinder.6 The decided cases in Indiana so indicate.7
At the same time, however, it has been held that there is no
right to a jury trial in a foreclosure suit even as to the money
judgment, s and one paragraph of complaint, based on the recov-
ery of the debt and the foreclosure of the mortgage, is not sub-
ject to a motion to separate.9
Again the courts have insisted on regarding the action to fore-
close as being of equitable origin and they have failed to recog-
nize the distinction between the older suit to foreclose the
equity of redemption where there was no money judgment, but
merely a finding and decree as to the amount due' 0 (and there-
fore to be paid in redemption) and the present statutory action
where the judgment is for the sale of the property, and where
there may be a money judgment for the amount due.1 1
Foreclosure and Quiet Title. As pointed out in Section 15,
supra, the courts have reached the result that under the fore-
closure statutes the plaintiff may also quiet title. But again the
theory would seem to be that such relief was granted as inci-
dental to the foreclosure, and was not based on a separate cause
of action.
Sec. 20. The Separate Statement. The last sentence in Sec.
296 (7) 1 provides that "But causes of action so joined
must be separately stated and numbered." There is presupposed
5 See Sec. 1172, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
6 Sec. 15, supra.
7 Jenkinson v. Ewing, 17 Ind. 505 (1861) ; Rodman v. Rodman, 64 Ind.
65 (1878); Huston v. Fatka, 30 Ind. App. 693 (1903).
S Brown v. Russell, 105 Ind. 46 (1885). (Chattel mortgage); Car-
michael v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526 (1883) (real estate mortgage) ; Albrecht v.
Foster Lbr., 126 Ind. 318 (1890) (mechanic's lien); Bozarth v. MeGil-
licuddy, 19 Ind. App. 26 (1897 (street assessment lien).
9 Mans field v. Shipp, 128 Ind. 55 (1890).
18 See Bolles v. Duff, 43 N. Y. 469 (1871).
11 The confusion is apparent in the opinion in the case of Carmichael v.
Adams, supra, note 8.
See. 20.
1 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926. There is a similar provision in the com-
plaint statute. Sec. 359 (3) Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
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both (1) the joinder of two or more actions based on what the
substantive law regards as separate and distinct causes of action,
or rights, and (2) that the joinder is proper under the statutes
in question. This specific provision then deals with a pure
question of pleading, and requires that the actions joined be
represented by separate paragraphs of complaint, separately
numbered. The other provisions of the code dealing with the
law of pleading as to the plaintiff's complaint, and in particular
the one which provides that in the complaint the plaintiff shall
"state the facts constituting his cause of action,"2 apply here.
It is well to note, however, in this connection that the plaintiff
is now permitted to incorporate by reference into subsequent
paragraphs of his complaint allegations in previous paragraphs
which are properly identified under Sec. 361 Burns Annotated
Indiana Statutes 1926.3
What is One Cause of Action. As stated above there is pre-
supposed two or more causes of action, and that their joinder
is proper (or not objected to).
In this connection, it has been decided that an action against
a railroad company for sheep killed one day, and for horses
killed another day involves two causes of action ;4 that an action
to foreclose a chattel mortgage where the debt was evidenced by
two notes involved but one cause of action ;5 that an action for
seduction and conspiracy to procure an abortion against the
principal defendant and another involved but one cause of ac-
tion, that is, a joint tort;6 and it was apparently assumed on the
trial of the case of The Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. v. Worley7-
that an action for, animals killed by two different trains on the
same day involved two causes of action.
Question How Raised. There is no code provision on the
point, but the proper practice is to raise the question of the
separate statement by a motion to require the plaintiff to sepa-
rate the complaint into paragraphs as to each cause of action
stated.8 A demurrer for misjoinder is ill-taken for there is
2 Sec. 359, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
3 The statute deals with grammatical paragraphs and not counts or
paragraphs in the pleading sense.
4 The Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. v. Rooker, 90 Ind. 581 (1883).
5 Mansfield v. Shipp, 128 Ind. 55 (1890), and see the other cases cited,
supra, Sec. 19.
6 Gunder v. Tibbits, 153 Ind. 591 (1899).
7 107 Ind. 320 (1886).
8 Booher v. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490 (1873) (an answer involved, but
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presupposed a proper joinder,9 and there is no provision in the
demurrer statute which is applicable. 10 The motion to separate
must be in writing and specifically point out the causes of action
to be separated and give the reasons for the required separa-
tion."
Motion to Strike Out is Improper. It was said in the case of
Western Union Tel. Co. v. McClelland,12 that the proper remedy
is by motion to separate or motion to strike out. The latter is
quite obviously incorrect and the case of Hendry v. Hendry'3 is
to the contrary, and of course controlling.
One Cause and Part of Another Stated. If the complaint
states one cause of action and insufficiently states another cause
it has been held that the latter must be regarded as surplusage
and that a motion to separate is not well taken.14 The present
authority of those decisions, however, may well be questioned.
Under the present statute on waiver for failure to demurrer,
and similar provisions in the code at this time'15 almost any
attempted statement of a cause of action is a good complaint
unless properly questioned by the defendant.
The motion to separate should be filed before the demurrer,
and probably ought to be well taken today. At least fhe second
insufficient statement should constitute such prejudicial surplus-
ages to be subject to a motion to strike out.
Question May be Waived. Unless i proper motion is filed the
right to a separate statement is waived. 16
Not Reversible Error. The erroneous overruling of a proper
motion to separate is never reversible error.'7
the problem is the same); Western Union Tel. Co. v. McClelland, 38 Ind.
App. 578 (1906); Tishbein v. Paine, 52 Ind. App. 441 (1913).
9 Fish bein v. Paine, 52 Ind. App. 441 (1913).
1u Sec. 362, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
"1 Scott v. The Indianapolis Wagon Works, 48 Ind. 75 (1874); Hay V.
State ev rel., 58 Ind. 337 (1877); Rich v. Fry, 196 Ind. 303 (1925).
12 38 Ind. App. 578 (1906).
13 32 Ind. 349 (1869).
14 Booher v. Goldsborough, 44 Ind. 490 (1873) ; Shaw v. Ayers, 17 Ind.
App. 614 (1897).
15 Secs. 366, 368, 423, 426, 725 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
16 Western Union Tel. Co. v. McClelland, 38 Ind. App. 578 (1906);
Hendry v. Hendry, 32 Ind. 349 (1869).
17 See, Shaw v. Ayres, 17 Ind. App. 614 (1897), and cases there cited;
also, Fishbein v. Paine, 52 Ind. App. 441 (1912), and Rich v. Fry, 196 Ind.
303 (1926).
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Exception in Trespass Q. C. F. As pointed out above 18 at
common law and under the code the plaintiff might regard sev-
eral trespasses to real estate as parts of one cause of action, and
recover for them on one paragraph of complaint under a con-
tinuando.19 A motion to separate in such a case would not be
well taken.
Several Paragraphs on the Same Cause of Action. 1. A
plaintiff may have two or more distinct and unconnected causes
of action against a defendant, for example on contract 1 and 2,
or on tort 1 and 2. Clearly the statute in question here applies.
2. A plaintiff may have two or more causes of action, which
however cover the same liability, for example, a tort liability
and a contract liability for injury to goods shipped by common
carrier. Again the statute in question here applies and the
question of a possible double recovery is governed by the law of
election of remedies. 3. A plaintiff may have in fact and in law,
only one of two or more possible causes of action, for example,
a railroad employee's right to recover for injuries may be either
a right under the Federal Employee's Liability Act, or a right
under the State Common or Statute Law, depending on whether
in fact and in law he was "employed" in interstate commerce at
the time of injury, or a right under a State Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, depending again on that fact plus other require-
ments made by the act. The laws involved are mutually exclu-
sive, however, and in law and in fact the plaintiff only has one
right. As to the first two at least the plaintiff may sue either
in the state courts or Federal courts, although as to the latter
two there must exist diversity of citizenship.2 0 The rights are
both injuries to person, and also arise out of the same transac-
tion, so that the joinder is proper. But is there one cause of
action or two: must there be a separate statement under the
Federal Law and the State Law? Arguing that because there
can finally only be one recovery the New York Court of Appeals
has said that there is but one cause of action, and that therefore
but one paragraph of complaint is required.21 But such a de-
cision confuses the substantive law with procedural law.22 The
18 Sec. 10, supra.
19 Rucker v. McNeely, 4 Blackf. 179 (1826); Holeraft v. King, 25 Ind.
352 (1865).
20 45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 56; 36 Stat. 291, Sec. 1. See note, 24 Ill. L. R.
467.
2 1 Payne v. N. Y. S. & W. R., 201 N. Y. 436, 95 N. E. 19 (1911).
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test here is not how many causes of action can the plaintiff ac-
tually prove under the substantive law, but how many does he
assert or claim? The fact that he cannot ultimately recover on
both does not destroy the fact that he does claim or assert two.
That there are two causes of action asserted seems very plain,
and particularly in view of the recent decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States to the effect that a right under the
Federal Act cannot even partially be based on a violation of a
State law.23 Most of the other decided cases are contrary to
the New York case.24 There are no Indiana decisions on the
subject, but the practice has been to regard them as two causes
of action. 4. A plaintiff confessedly may have but one cause of
action but he undertakes to state it upon different theories in
separate paragraphs, or in the same paragraph of complaint.
Which is proper? Clearly if the different paragraphs of com-
plaint are so similar as to be in substance the same statement of
facts, they are repetitious and all but the first should be stricken
out on a proper motion.26 At the same time it is proper to state
the same cause of action in separate paragraphs of complaint,
but upon different theories as to the facts. 20 Although it is
proper, for example, to allege several specific acts of negligence
in one paragraph of the complaint, and the plaintiff can recover
upon proof of any one.27 The distinction seems to be between
those cases where the facts alleged are cumulative and where
they are repugnant. In the first they may be alleged in one
paragraph of complaint; in the second they must be alleged in
separate paragraphs of complaint, because of the rule that
repugnant allegations destroy each other if they are contained
in the same paragraph of complaint.28
22 For a somewhat similar confusion, see the recent case of Duvall v.
Ranson, etc., Co. (Ind. App.), 169 N. E. 437 (1930), where the court holds
a set-off or counterclaim to be not within the code provisions on the sub-
ject because in law and fact it appeared that the plaintiff had a defense
to it.
23 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Stapleton, 279 U. S. 587, 49 S. Ct. Rep. 442,
73 L. Ed. 861 (1929), and see note in 24 Ill. L. R. 580.
24 They are collected in 45 U. S. C. A., Sec. 51, note 446.
25 Holcraft v. King, 25 Ind. 352 (1865).
26 Ibid. Chicago, T. & R. L. Ry. v. Barker, 169 Ind. 670 (1908).
2 7 Lathrop v. Frank Bird Transfer Co., 81 Ind. App. 549 (1924).
28 State ex rel. v. Foulkes, 94 Ind. 493 (1883); The Second Nat'l Bk. v.




The result is that additional paragraphs of complaint need
not allege additional causes of action, but may be based on the
same cause of action, but on allegations of inconsistent facts.
Such a rule is neither inconsistent, nor consistent with the rule
as to the separate statement of several causes of action under
the joinder statute. It involves an entirely different proposition,
the method of allegation as to inconsistent facts constituting
but one right.
Sec. 21. The Separate Trial. The last sentence in Sec. 288'
provides that "when several causes of action are united, belong-
ing to any of the foregoing classes, the court may order separate
trials, for the furtherance of justice." This clause presupposes
both a proper joinder and a proper separate statement; although
it would seem clear that neither of those is a prerequisite to the
ordering of separate trials, under the inherent powers of the
court to regulate trial convenience. 2
The result is that upon motion of either party, or on motion
of the court, the actions joined do not have to be tried at the
same time, unless it is desirable to so try them. There appear
to be no cases decided under this clause, but the situation would
be within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is doubtful if
an adverse ruling would ever be reversible error.3 If, however,
there has been a misjoinder, which is properly questioned by
demurrer, and a motion for separate trial is refused, it has been
held that this may constitute reversible error.4
A party cannot object to a joint trial after it his been started,
his right, if any, to a separate trial having been waived.5
Sec. 22. Question of Misjoinder: How Raised. Sec. 362 (6)'
provides that a party may demurrer for the reason "That the
several causes of action have been improperly joined."
This provision gives the only means of raising a question of
misjoinder of causes of action.2 And so a motion to separately
1 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
2 See, Rich v. Fry, 196 Ind. 303 (1926).
3 See, Secs. 426 and 725 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, and Rich v. Fry,
196 Ind. 303 (1926). See, also, Boonville National Bank v. Blakely, 166
Ind. 427 (1906).
4 Boonville Nat'l Bank v. Blakely, supra, No. 3.
5 Mikels v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 79 Ind. App. 165 (1922).
Sec. 22.
1 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
2 Langsdale v. Woolen, 120 Ind. 16 (1889).
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docket the misjoinder action presents no question.3 And a de-
murrer for insufficient facts is not well taken.4
Court Must Separately Docket Misjoinder Action. Section
3635 provides that "Where a demurrer is sustained (for mis-
joinder of actions) the court shall cause as many separate
actions to be docketed between the parties as there are causes
decided by the court to be improperly joined, and each shall
stand as a separate action."
Under this statute although a demurrer for misjoinder is sus-
tained the plaintiff does not have to start his actions over. Each
action so separately docketed constitutes a separate action, as if
it had been originally begun as a separate action.6
It would seem that any motion here was unnecessary because
the statute imposes the duty on the judge to act. But it was
assumed in Rich v. Fry7 that such a motion was proper, but its
overruling was not reversible error. So far as the record dis-
closes there was no demurrer for misjoinder filed, and therefore
the statute could not apply. It appears from the cases cited in
the opinion s that the court is confused in its assumption, and
that possibly it was dealing with the motion as a motion for a
separate trial.
Sec. 23. Effect of Misjoinder-Waiver-Reversible Error.
Unless properly questioned the misjoinder of actions is waived.'
And Sec. 3642 specifically provides that the improper overruling
of a demurrer for misjoinder of actions is not reversible error.3
The practical result of this is that it lies within the power of
the court (subject to review only as to the so-called abuse of
judicial discretion) to adopt its own views as to the proper
joinder of actions; for any technical misjoinder under the code
3 Ibid., Cf., Giller v. West, 162 Ind. 17 (1904), and Rich V. Fry, 196 Ind.
303 (1926), containing language to the contrary.
4 Board of Commrs. v. Redifer, 32 Ind. App. 93 (1903), and cases there
cited.
5 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
6 Gillen v. West, 162 Ind. 17 (1904).
7 196 Ind. 303, 311 (1926).
8 Langsdale v. Woolen, 120 Ind. 16 (1889), and Cargar v. Fee, 140 Ind.
572 (1894).
See. 23.
1 Langsdale v. Woolen, 120 Ind. 16 (1889).
2 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
3 See, Chicago, L & S. R. v. Taylor, 183 Ind. 240 (1915); and Wells v.
Whiting, 75 Ind. App. 85 (1920).
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may be sustained in any event under the powers of a court to
consolidate actions.4 But it has been held that if there was a
misjoinder of actions and a motion for separate trials was over-
ruled it may constitute reversible error.5 And if there was both
a misjoinder of parties and of causes of action there may again
be reversible error.6
Sec. 24. Consolidation of Actions. Sec. 9836' specifically
provides for the consolidation of actions brought to foreclose
mechanics' liens against real property. This means that al-
though a joinder in the first instance would be prohibited, be-
cause of the provisions in the joinder statute to the effect that
the actions joined must affect all of the parties to the action, 2
upon motion separate actions affecting the same property may
be consolidated, or joined.3
But in addition to this statutory power to consolidate actions
the courts possess an inherent power in that respect.4 No case
has attempted to define the limits of this power. It seems quite
clear, however, that if separate actions have been begun which
might have been joined under the joinder statutes of the code,
that on motion by either party or the court, such actions could
be consolidated for the purpose of one trial, with the consequent
saving of time and expense.
If there are involved separate actions which could not have
been joined in the first instance, then as to whether or not the
actions should be consolidated ought to depend on whether or not
a single trial is possible and reasonably expedient.5
4 See Sec. 24, infra, and Northwestern Loan, etc., Assn. v. McP.herson,
23 Ind. App. 250 (1899).
5 Boonville Nat'l Bank v. Blakely, 166 Ind. 427 (1906).
6 Tobin v. Connery, 13 Ind. 65 (1859).
See. 24.
' Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
2 Supra, Sec. 6, and see, Northwestern Loam Assoc. v. McPherson, 23
Ind. App. 250 (1899).
3 Central States Mfg. Co. v. Parker-Russell Mining, etc., Co., 196 Ind.
163 (1925). In the case cited the court relied on the inherent power of the
court to order the consolidation, and not the statute in question.
4 Atkinson v. Disher, 177 Ind. 665 (1912).
5 Ibid. See, also, Oldfather v. Zent, 11 Ind. App. 430 (1894) (actions
for malicious prosecution, and new trial of first action on newly discovered
evidence after term); Horne v. Harness, 18 Ind. App. 214 (1897) (semble);
Turner v. Simpson, 12 Ind. 413 (1859) (separate actions by one on several
notes, tried together); Grant v. Davis, 5 Ind. App. 116 (1892) (two sepa-
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The refusal to consolidate is not reversible error ;6 and in no
event are the rights of the parties on the trial to be prejudiced
by consolidation.7
The result of this doctrine is that a joinder in fact may be
accomplished in any cases where a trial of separate actions is
inexpedient. The result is in truth the same as that accom-
plished by the recent amendment to the New York Code which
strikes out of that code the requirement that the "action joined
affect all of the parties to the action" so that after all the ques-
tion presented is one of trial convenience, depending largely
upon the question as to whether or not the actions present a
common question of law and fact."
There is nothing in the doctrine of consolidation of actions
which enlarges the jurisdiction of a court of equity as to a bill
of peace, and the two (consolidation and bill of peace) cannot be
used to defeat the parties' rights to a jury trial.9
rate claims against an estate, one for money and one for a conveyance,
consolidated); Frankel v. Michigan Mut. Life Ins. Co., 158 Ind. 304
(1902) (action against agent and hus sureties; consolidated); Hodgin V.
Hodgin, 175 Ind. 157 (1911) (action of partition and foreclosure, consoli-
dated); Trook v. Crouch, 82 Ind. App. 309 (1923) (consolidation denied).
6 Trook v. Crouch, 82 Ind. App. 309 (1923).
7 Midland R. v. Island Coal Co., 126 Ind. 384 (1890) (one party cannot
bind another by agreement for continuance).
s See, for example, Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 203 N.
Y. S. 709 (1924).
9 Vandalia Coal Co. v. Sauson, 43 Ind. App. 226 (1909).
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